الأردن: الإعلام والتمييز

مدونة حبر

يلجأ الشبيحة في الأردن إلى خطاب عنصري ويريد أن يعمق انقساما في الأردن موجها ضد الأردنيين الفلسطينيين، وذلك وسط تصاعد المطالب الأردنية الديمقراطية. فمثله مثل كل نظام عربي يلجأ إلى فزاعة “الفتنة”، وها هو إعلاه يجاريه. هنا موضوع عن الخطاب الإعلامي والتمييز من موقع “حبر” بشأن طريقة التعامل المجتزأة مع وثائق موقع ويكيليكس:

هل يجهل “صوت الأغلبية الصامتة” الفرق بين تشكيل لجنة مهمتها “البدء بتجنيس أبناء الضفة الغربية” وأخرى مهمتها النظر في الحالات “المهددة بسحب الجنسية الأردنية”؟ هل يجهل الموقع الذي يتباهي بأنه ينفرد بالتسريبات من داخل أروقة الوزارات الفرق بين معنى القول بأن المساواة في الحقوق يجب أن تدخل “حيز التنفيذ” وبين الوقع الذي تحدثه اضافة كلمة “بالقوة” على فرض الحقوق المتساوية؟

بقية الموضوع

One Comment to “الأردن: الإعلام والتمييز”

  1. هذا هو النص الأصلي نرجو منك ترجمته ووضع الترجمة وعدم التجديف بما لا تعرف وعدم الدفاع لأنك فقط تريد الدفاع عن الفلسطينيين
    ¶23……….. Rantawi calls for a comprehensive peace process that would resolve issues of identity and rights for Palestinians in Jordan as part of the “package.” This, he says, would require major reforms in Jordan, its transformation into a constitutional monarchy in which greater executive authority is devolved, and external pressure on the Government of Jordan to ensure that equal rights for Palestinians are enforced
    اما فيما يخص المساواة بإمكانك الإطلاع على الوثيقة الأصلية وترجمتها واخبارنا كيف طالب عريب الرنتاوي بالمساواة ومع من؟
    هل طالب بمساواة الأردني بالأردني؟
    ارجو منك الإجابة لا ان تكون كالحمير تحمل اسفارا.

    هذا نص الوثيقة الأصلي نرجو منك ترجمته
    كنا نتمنى على موقع حبر ان يترجم كل تلك الوثائق كما كان يفعل سابقا بدل ان ينكرها أو يحاول تلفيقها وتزويرها عندما تبين كيف كان بعض السياسيين من اصول فلسطينية يتآمرون على الأردن من خلال السفير الأمريكي

    هذا هو النص الأصلي
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08AMMAN391.html
    ارجو ان تساعدنا في ترجمتها ان كنت صادقا
    Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
    08AMMAN391 2008-02-06 14:43 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Amman
    VZCZCXRO0816
    RR RUEHROV
    DE RUEHAM #0391/01 0371443
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 061443Z FEB 08
    FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1708
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVEC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 AMMAN 000391

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA AND IPA

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2018
    TAGS: PGOV PREF KPAL JO
    SUBJECT: THE RIGHT OF RETURN: WHAT IT MEANS IN JORDAN

    REF: A. 07 AMMAN 4762
    ¶B. AMMAN 140
    ¶C. ADNAN ABU ODEH – “JORDANIANS PALESTINIANS AND
    THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM” (1999)

    Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary: The right of return for Palestinians is one
    of the issues at the heart of the debate over what it means
    to be Jordanian. Though our GOJ interlocutors insist that
    the theoretical option of return remains, they are now more
    engaged with the issue of compensation, both for individual
    Palestinians and for Jordan itself. For Jordanians of
    Palestinian origin, the right of return is either an empty
    (if cherished) slogan or a legitimate aspiration. For East
    Bankers, the right of return is often held up as the panacea
    which will recreate Jordan’s bedouin or Hashemite identity.
    The issue is inextricably linked with governmental and
    societal discrimination toward the Palestinian-origin
    community, and poses a challenge to Jordan’s political
    reforms. Jordanians of Palestinian origin (and many, but not
    all, of the East Bankers we speak to) assume that an end to
    the question of the right of return will lead to equal
    treatment and full political inclusion within Jordan. Yet
    neither East Bankers nor Palestinians are willing to make the
    first move toward publicly acknowledging this “grand
    bargain.” In the absence of public debate — which would be
    both highly sensitive and taboo-breaking — or government
    action, the issues surrounding the right of return will
    continue to fester. In the absence of a viable and
    functioning Palestinian state, those who are charged with
    protecting the current identity of the Jordanian state will
    be loath to consider measures that they firmly believe could
    end up bringing to fruition the nightmare scenario of “Jordan
    is Palestine.” End Summary.

    Government Strategy: Compensation Trumps Return
    ——————————————— —

    ¶2. (C) The Jordanian government’s official stance on the
    right of return has changed very little over the years. The
    MFA’s current position paper on the matter notes that
    “refugees who have Jordanian citizenship expect the State to
    protect their basic right of return and compensation in
    accordance with international law.” As recently as January
    23, the King reiterated the standard line in an interview
    with the Al-Dustour newspaper: “As for the Palestinian
    refugees in Jordan, we stress once again that their Jordanian
    citizenship does not deprive them of the right to return and
    compensation.”

    ¶3. (C) Yet, behind the scenes, some officials strike a more
    nuanced tone. “We consider ourselves realists” says Bisher
    Khasawneh, former Director of the Jordan Information Center
    and now Europe and Americas Bureau Chief at the MFA, where he
    earlier served as Legal Advisor and Negotiations Coordination
    Bureau (NCB) Director. “The modalities won’t allow for the
    right of return.” Current NCB Director Nawaf Tal
    acknowledges that while Jordan “cannot be frank about the
    right of return,” it has essentially dropped the concept of a
    “right” of return from its negotiating position. Officials
    now emphasize the right of Palestinians to choose whether or
    not to return, with the apparent assumption that many will
    not exercise that right. Note: Regardless of the Jordanian
    government’s lack of a public shift on the matter,
    Palestinian-origin contacts we talk to see a change and
    recognize it as consistent with the Palestinian Authority’s
    own actual stance. End Note.

    ¶4. (C) Deputy Director of the Department of Palestinian
    Affairs Mahmoud Agrabawi, whose agency works closely with
    UNRWA in the refugee camps, told us that the most important
    thing is that Palestinians be given the choice of whether to
    go back or not. He declined to estimate how many would want
    to exercise that right, but he did raise a point about
    internal differences of status among the refugee population
    in Jordan. Those who are most likely to want to leave are
    the impoverished residents of refugee camps in Jordan – most
    of whom are Palestinians (or their descendants) who fled in
    1948 from what became the State of Israel. (Note: Roughly
    330,000 of the 1.9 million Palestinian refugees in Jordan
    live in camps. About half of those living in camps
    originated from Gaza and, therefore, do not hold Jordanian
    citizenship. End note.) They will not, however, want to
    return to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza
    because they would be unable to reclaim their ancestral homes
    inside Israel, and thus would in a sense (albeit not a legal
    one) merely become refugees in a new country, said Agrabawi.

    ¶5. (C) Jordan’s government divides the compensation question
    in two parts. The first (and primary) issue is compensation

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    for individual Palestinian refugees. When asked about how
    compensation would be delivered and determined, Tal indicated
    to us that the Jordanian government was essentially agnostic
    on the issue. He, like many other contacts, is concerned
    more about the symbolic importance of personal compensation
    than about its amount or means of delivery.

    ¶6. (C) Along with individual compensation for refugees,
    Jordan expects compensation for the economic and social
    burden of taking on massive influxes of people in 1948 and
    1967, in addition to what Tal terms “damages” inflicted on
    Jordanian infrastructure by Israeli military actions
    throughout the years. The GOJ conducts periodic studies on
    this issue, and in fact has an internally agreed upon amount
    that it will use in negotiations. (Tal told us that the most
    recent study is two years old, and the amount of expected
    compensation is due to be updated soon.) According to Tal,
    this amount has not yet been shared with the GOI (nor would
    he share it with us).

    Palestinian Expectations: The Dream and the Reality
    ——————————————— ——

    ¶7. (C) When it comes to thinking about the right of return,
    Palestinians in Jordan fall into roughly two camps. In the
    first are those who align themselves with the government
    approach, keeping up the rhetoric for the sake of
    appearances, but behind closed doors quickly abandoning
    return as a political and logistical impossibility. This
    group is more concerned about personal compensation (and
    doubts that Jordan would ever have the chutzpah to ask for
    “structural” compensation). In the second camp are those who
    cling to the principle. For the most part, this latter view
    is probably most prevalent among refugee camp residents who
    hope to be plucked out of landless poverty by a peace
    agreement and the compensation that may come with it. It is
    difficult, if not impossible, to determine the breakdown of
    how many people are in each group. Note: As noted in Ref B,
    polling on Palestinian-origin versus East Banker political
    preferences in Jordan is taboo, because it acknowledges
    uncomfortable truths about the divide within Jordan’s
    national identity. End Note.

    ¶8. (C) In conversations with us, many Palestinian-origin
    Jordanians readily acknowledge that the right of return is
    merely a fantasy. “It’s not practical,” says political
    activist Jemal Refai. “I’m not going to ask Israel to commit
    suicide.” Adel Irsheid, who during the 1990s served as
    Director of the Department of Occupied Territories Affairs at
    the Foreign Ministry, said Palestinian-origin Jordanians
    still harbor the emotions associated with the right of
    return, but do not seek it on a practical level. Taking a
    few specific steps down the road to practicality, Ghazi
    al-Sa’di, an independent Palestinian National Council (PNC)
    member, told us in confidence that there will have to be a
    tradeoff between the right of return and the uprooting of
    Israeli settlements in the West Bank – the only realistic
    destination for Palestinians who “return”.

    ¶9. (C) As noted, however, the principle of the right of
    return still holds considerable sway among others. “There is
    no question about the right of return. It is a sacred
    right,” contends Palestinian-origin parliamentarian Mohammed
    Al-Kouz. During a meeting with Amman-resident PNC members,
    one contact said: “The right of return is my personal right,
    and my humanitarian right.” Indeed, this is how many
    Palestinian-origin contacts in Jordan think about the right
    of return – as something they are owed as part of a de facto
    social contract supported by Arab politicians and enshrined
    in UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions for
    60 years.

    ¶10. (C) An interesting piece of the debate is the way in
    which perceptions on the right of return (usually expressed
    in conspiracy theories) become part of the mythology and
    assumptions of Palestinian-origin Jordanians. Refai
    hypothesizes that government pressure, not genuine feeling,
    produces doctrinaire statements on the right of return among
    Jordanian Palestinians. He insists that the General
    Intelligence Department (GID) and the government foster an
    atmosphere in which anything other than a solid endorsement
    of the right of return is met with official scorn, and thinks
    that the debate would shift if this atmosphere was changed.
    Other Palestinian figures such as PNC Member Isa Al-Shuaibi –
    a newspaper columnist who runs Palestinian chief negotiator
    Ahmad Qurei’s Amman office – express the dominant feeling
    that the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Islamic Action Front
    (which fires up its base with talk about Palestinian rights –
    Ref C) is the prime mover in stoking the fires of Palestinian
    nationalism in Jordan around the right of return. In a
    typical parliamentary speech, IAF member Hamzah Mansur

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    recently decried “President Bush’s confiscation of the
    Palestinian refugees’ right to repatriation.”

    East Banker Expectations: Waiting for Their Country Back?
    ——————————————— ————

    ¶11. (C) East Bankers have an entirely different approach to
    thinking about the right of return. At their most benign,
    our East Banker contacts tend to count on the right of return
    as a solution to Jordan’s social, political, and economic
    woes. But underlying many conversations with East Bankers is
    the theory that once the Palestinians leave, “real”
    Jordanians can have their country back. They hope for a
    solution that will validate their current control of Jordan’s
    government and military, and allow for an expansion into the
    realm of business, which is currently dominated by
    Palestinians.

    ¶12. (C) Palestinian-origin contacts certainly have their
    suspicions about East Banker intentions. “If the right of
    return happens, East Bankers assume that all of the
    Palestinians will leave,” says parliamentarian Mohammed
    Al-Kouz. Other Palestinian-origin contacts offered similar
    observations, including Adel Irsheid and Raja’i Dajani, who
    was one of the founding members of the GID, and later served
    as Interior Minister at the time of Jordan’s administrative
    separation from the West Bank in 1988. Dajani cited the rise
    of what he called “Likudnik” East Bankers, who hold out hope
    that the right of return will lead to an “exodus” of
    Palestinians.

    ¶13. (C) In fact, many of our East Banker contacts do seem
    more excited about the return (read: departure) of
    Palestinian refugees than the Palestinians themselves.
    Mejhem Al-Khraish, an East Banker parliamentarian from the
    central bedouin district, says outright that the reason he
    strongly supports the right of return is so the Palestinians
    will quit Jordan. East Banker Mohammed Al-Ghazo, Secretary
    General at the Ministry of Justice, says that Palestinians
    have no investment in the Jordanian political system – “they
    aren’t interested in jobs in the government or the military”
    – and are therefore signaling their intent to return to a
    Palestinian state.

    ¶14. (C) When East Bankers talk about the possibility of
    Palestinians staying in Jordan permanently, they use the
    language of political threat and economic instability. Talal
    Al-Damen, a politician in Um Qais near the confluence of
    Jordan, the Golan Heights and Israel, worries that without
    the right of return, Jordan will have to face up to the
    political challenges of a state which is not united
    demographically. For his part, Damen is counting on a mass
    exodus of Palestinians to make room for East Bankers in the
    world of business, and to change Jordan’s political
    landscape. This sentiment was echoed in a meeting with
    university students, when self-identified “pure Jordanians”
    in the group noted that “opportunities” are less available
    because there are so many Palestinians.

    ¶15. (C) The right of return is certainly lower on the list
    of East Banker priorities in comparison with their
    Palestinian-origin brethren, but some have thought the issue
    through a little more. NGO activist Sa’eda Kilani predicts
    that even (or especially) after a final settlement is
    reached, Palestinians will choose to abandon a Palestinian
    state in favor of a more stable Jordan where the issue of
    political equality has been resolved. In other words, rather
    than seeing significant numbers return to a Palestinian
    homeland, Jordan will end up dealing with a net increase in
    its Palestinian population.

    ¶16. (C) As with their Palestinian counterparts, conspiracy
    theories are an intrinsic part of East Banker mythology
    regarding the right of return. Fares Braizat, Deputy
    Director of the Center for Strategic Studies at Jordan
    University, told us two of the most commonly held examples
    (which he himself swears by). The first is that Jordanians
    of Palestinian origin choose not to vote because if they were
    to turn out en masse, Israel (and/or the United States) would
    assume that they had incorporated themselves fully into
    Jordanian society and declare the right of return to be null
    and void. The second conspiracy theory, which has a similar
    theme, is that after the 1994 peace agreement between Jordan
    and Israel, the Palestinian leadership in the West Bank
    issued a deliberate directive to “all Palestinians” residing
    in Jordan to avoid involvement in Jordanian politics so as
    not to be perceived as “going native.” The main point of
    both theories is that Palestinians are planning to return to
    a future Palestinian state, and therefore have nothing
    substantive to contribute to the Jordanian political debate –
    a convenient reason for excluding them from that debate in

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    the first place.

    The Nexus Between the Right of Return and Discrimination
    ——————————————— ———–

    ¶17. (C) The right of return in Jordan is inextricably linked
    with the problem of semi-official discrimination toward the
    Palestinian-origin community. Braizat claims it is “the
    major reason that keeps the Jordanian political system the
    way it is.” As long as the right of return is touted as a
    real solution, East Bankers will continue to see Palestinians
    as temporary residents in “their” country. This provides the
    justification to minimize the role of Palestinian-origin
    Jordanians in public life, since they are “foreigners” whose
    loyalty is suspect and who could in theory pack up and leave
    at any time. Note: The suspicion of disloyalty is deeply
    rooted in Black September, when Palestinian militants
    attempted to wrest political control from the Hashemite
    regime. Since then, Palestinians have been progressively
    excluded from the Jordanian security forces and civil service
    (Ref D). End Note. The suggestion that Palestinians should
    be granted full political representation in Jordan is often
    met with accusations that doing so would “cancel” or
    “prejudge” the right of return. For their part, many
    Palestinian-origin Jordanians are less concerned with
    “prejudging” the right of return, and more concerned with
    fulfilling their roles as Jordanian citizens who are eligible
    for the full range of political and social rights guaranteed
    by law.

    ¶18. (C) Al-Quds Center for Political Studies Director Oraib
    Rantawi, whose institute has been organizing refugee camp
    focus groups, cites widespread discrimination that is
    semi-officially promoted by the government. In his
    estimation, the prospect of a “return” to Palestine is linked
    to the sense that Palestinian-origin Jordanians are “not
    Jordanian enough to be full citizens.” He asserts that this
    sentiment on the part of the ruling elite is increasingly
    trumping the idea of right of return as the primary political
    concern among Palestinian-origin Jordanians. According to
    Rantawi (and many other contacts), the sense of alienation is
    most widespread among the poorer, more disenfranchised
    Palestinians of the refugee camps, but he cited growing
    alienation among the more integrated and successful
    Palestinians in Jordan. “Palestinians feel that something is
    wrong, whether they live in a refugee camp or (the upscale
    Amman district of) Abdoun. We have to take Palestinians out
    of this environment,” says former minister Irsheid. This
    tracks with the conventional wisdom which theorizes that an
    integrated Palestinian-origin community would have a stake in
    what happens in Jordan, and therefore less reason to be
    perceived as a threat.

    ¶19. (C) In Irsheid’s view, the refugee question would be
    resolved when Palestinians in Jordan obtained justice and
    political rights and benefited from economic development
    (note: Palestinian-origin Jordanians already dominate many
    areas of the economy, especially in the retail sector).
    Offering a litany of familiar complaints about
    discrimination, Irsheid lamented that treatment of
    Palestinians in Jordan ignores the disproportionate
    contribution they have made to Jordanian society. He said
    that when Palestinians were allowed in key positions
    throughout the government they were “more qualified and more
    loyal” than others.

    ¶20. (C) While Jordanians of Palestinian origin are not shy
    about their origins, many stress just as strongly their
    strong connections and loyalty to Jordan. Jemal Refai says,
    “I consider myself Jordanian. Nobody can tell me otherwise.”
    Mohammed Abu Baker, who represents the PLO in Amman, says,
    “if you tell me to go back to Jenin, I won’t go. This is a
    fact – Palestinian refugees in Jordan have better living
    conditions.” PNC member Isa Al-Shuaibi simply notes that
    “Palestinians in Jordan are not refugees. They are citizens.”

    ¶21. (C) While the idea of the right of return is extolled at
    the highest levels, ordinary Palestinians see backwards
    movement when it comes to the practicalities of their
    citizenship. Many of our contacts resent the
    “Palestinian-origin” label that appears on their passports
    and national identity cards. Former Interior Minister Raja’i
    Dajani recounted a meeting that he and several other
    Palestinian-Jordanian notables held with the King last year
    in which they raised concerns that Palestinian-origin
    Jordanians who returned from extended stays in the West Bank
    were being told they would only be able to receive a
    temporary Jordanian passport on renewal – a backhanded way to
    deprive Palestinian-origin Jordanians of their citizenship
    rights. According to Dajani, the King “ordered” that a
    commission be formed by Dajani, former Prime Minister Taher

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    al-Masri, and GID Director Muhammad Dahabi to discuss the
    issue, but that all efforts to follow up with Dahabi were
    ignored.

    A Grand Bargain?
    —————-

    ¶22. (C) A common theme that emerges from discussions with
    Palestinian-origin contacts and some government officials
    (although not necessarily East Bankers as a group) is a
    “grand bargain” whereby Palestinians give up their
    aspirations to return in exchange for integration into
    Jordan’s political system. For East Bank politicians and
    regime supporters, this deal could help solve the assumed
    dual loyalty of Palestinians in Jordan. For
    Palestinian-origin citizens, the compact would, ideally,
    close the book on their antagonistic relationship with the
    state and open up new opportunities for government employment
    and involvement in the political process.

    ¶23. (C) “If we give up our right of return, they have to
    give us our political rights,” says Refai. “In order for
    Jordan to become a real state, we have to become one people.”
    Rantawi calls for a comprehensive peace process that would
    resolve issues of identity and rights for Palestinians in
    Jordan as part of the “package.” This, he says, would
    require major reforms in Jordan, its transformation into a
    constitutional monarchy in which greater executive authority
    is devolved, and external pressure on the Government of
    Jordan to ensure that equal rights for Palestinians are
    enforced.

    ¶24. (C) If a peace agreement fails to secure political
    rights for Palestinian-origin Jordanians as they define those
    rights, many of our contacts see the right of return as an
    insurance policy through which Palestinians would vote with
    their feet. Refai asks: “If we aren’t getting our political
    rights, then how can we be convinced to give up our right of
    return?” Palestinian-Jordanian Fuad Muammar, editor of
    Al-Siyasa Al-Arabiyya weekly, noted that in the past few
    years there has been a proliferation of “right of return
    committees” in Palestinian refugee camps. This phenomenon,
    he said, reflected growing dissatisfaction with Jordanian
    government steps to improve their lot here and an increased
    focus on Palestine.

    ¶25. (C) Comment: Just because there is a logic to trading
    the right of return for political rights in Jordan does not
    mean that such a strategy is realistic, and it certainly will
    not be automatic. There are larger, regime-level questions
    that would have to be answered before Palestinian-origin
    Jordanians could be truly accepted and integrated into
    Jordanian society and government. In the absence of a viable
    and functioning Palestinian state, those who are charged with
    protecting the current identity of the Jordanian state will
    be loath to consider measures that they firmly believe could
    end up bringing to fruition Jordan is Palestine – or
    “al-Watan al-Badeel.” It is far from certain that East
    Bankers would be willing to give up the pride of place that
    they currently hold in a magnanimous gesture to their
    Palestinian-origin brethren. Senior judge Al-Ghazo told us:
    “In my opinion, nothing will change in Jordan after the right
    of return. East Bankers will keep their positions, and the
    remaining Palestinians will keep theirs.” Likewise, none of
    our Palestinian contacts who saw a post-peace process
    environment as a necessary condition for their greater
    integration in Jordan offered a compelling case as to why it
    would be sufficient. End Comment.

    (Not) Preparing for the End Game
    ——————————–

    ¶26. (C) In the absence of concrete movement on the right of
    return, Palestinian-origin Jordanians and East Bankers blame
    each other for not doing enough to either promote social
    harmony or prepare public opinion for an abandonment of the
    right of return. Both sides are used to trumpeting the same
    lines about unity in the Palestinian cause, and are hesitant
    to deviate from the standardized rhetoric lest they be
    perceived as offering “concessions” to Israel. Similarly,
    each is waiting for the other to make the first move, while
    hoping that an external agreement between Israel and the
    Palestinians will emerge so they will not be forced to
    compromise and accept the current “temporary” situation as
    permanent.

    ¶27. (C) “The problem is not the return, the problem is the
    right of return,” says Al-Shuaibi. The concept of returning
    as a right which is guaranteed by UN resolutions and Arab
    solidarity will be difficult to change in the event of a
    comprehensive settlement. He posits that in the end,

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    Palestinians who hold orthodox positions on the right of
    return are the same people who are unlikely to accept any
    peace agreement, no matter how generous. He thus sees little
    need to prepare the ground for a shift in tactics, as
    “reasonable” Palestinians have already recognized that
    abandoning this particular demand is inevitable.

    ¶28. (C) Jordanian government officials are adamant that the
    right of return issue must be resolved before the question of
    Palestinian identity can be dealt with in a domestic
    political context. In a meeting with a Congressional
    delegation, Chief of the Royal Court Bassem Awadallah
    asserted that once the Palestinian issue is solved, a whole
    raft of political reforms (including proportional
    representation) could be in the offing (Ref A). “We tried
    starting this debate in the 1990s, when things were better,”
    says Nawaf Tal of the MFA. “We talked about the potential
    for reform in the context of an agreement. In the end,
    nothing happened in the peace process, and we looked like
    liars. We have learned our lesson.” Having been burned
    once, Tal predicted that the GOJ will not resume a public
    debate until peace talks are “at an advanced stage.”

    ¶29. (C) Both sides in the debate over right of return
    complain that the first move in the solution to the issue of
    Palestinians in Jordan is not under their direct control.
    The blame for this situation automatically falls on Israel,
    often with a corollary involvement of the United States. The
    standard argument says that if the United States pressured
    Israel and the Palestinians to come to an agreement, that
    would cause Jordan to deal with the discrimination issue.
    Parliamentarian Al-Kouz told us the typical refrain of his
    largely Palestinian-origin constituents: “If it wanted to,
    the United States could solve the Palestinian question in
    half an hour.” In spite of all the public posturing, there
    is behind the scenes recognition that a 180 degree turn on
    the issue will be difficult. Nawaf Tal told us frankly that
    “the current national debate over the role of Palestinians in
    Jordanian society is damaging,” but nevertheless would remain
    stifled until the issue of return was solved definitively.

    Comment
    ——-

    ¶30. (C) As Israel and the Palestinian Authority reengage on
    final status issues after a seven-year negotiations hiatus,
    the “Right of Return” is sure to become a difficult emotional
    and substantive centerpiece of talks. In practical terms,
    this is the question that has greatest impact on Jordan –
    home to more Palestinians than any other country and the only
    Arab state that, as a rule, grants Palestinians citizenship.
    Yet, there is no consensus on how it should be dealt with and
    what its resolution will, or should, mean for Jordan.
    Conversations with our interlocutors – East Bankers and
    Jordanians of Palestinian origin – leads to the conclusion
    that this issue is less about Israeli-Palestinian peace than
    it is about the very nature and future of Jordan.

    Visit Amman’s Classified Web Site at
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/
    HALE

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